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Abstract—Privacy is an important requirement in vehicle
networks, because vehicles broadcast detailed location informa-
tion. Also of importance is accountability due to safety critical
applications. Conditional pseudonymity, i.e., usage of resolvable
pseudonyms, is a common approach to address both. Often,
resolvability of pseudonyms is achieved by authorities main-
taining pseudonym-identity mappings. However, these mappings
are privacy sensitive and require strong protection to prevent
abuse or leakage. We present a new approach that does not
rely on pseudonym-identity mappings to be stored by any party.
Resolution information is directly embedded in pseudonyms and
can only be accessed when multiple authorities cooperate. Our
privacy-preserving pseudonym issuance protocol ensures that
pseudonyms contain valid resolution information but prevents
issuing authorities from creating pseudonym-identity mappings.
I. INTRODUCTION
In inter-vehicular networks, also known as VANETs, wire-
less communication between vehicles facilitates cooperative
applications enhancing road safety, traffic efficiency, and driv-
ing convenience. Collision avoidance, real-time traffic infor-
mation, lane merge assistance, and accident warnings are
some of the envisioned applications. It is generally agreed
that security and privacy are mandatory requirements for the
deployment of VANETs. As a practical security approach,
the management of vehicle IDs and authentication by digital
signatures and public key certificates is proposed by research
projects [1] and standardization efforts [2]. Privacy issues arise
from frequent dissemination of beacon messages that con-
tain detailed vehicle-related information (e.g., position, speed,
heading), which can be abused for tracking and profiling of
individuals. However, solving it is a challenging task because
privacy approaches for VANETs are constrained by network
characteristics and security requirements [3].
One often proposed solution are frequently changing pseu-
donyms [1]. Here, a pseudonym is a public key certificate
which does not contain information linking it to a vehicle,
driver, or other pseudonyms. But accountability may be desired
to evict misbehaving nodes or assign liability after fatal acci-
dents. So some authorities must be able to resolve pseudonyms
to vehicle identities in certain situations. Therefore, only
conditional pseudonymity should be provided in VANETs.
The pseudonym lifecycle consists of several phases: During
pseudonym issuance, a vehicle obtains pseudonyms from a
certificate authority (CA). In the process, the vehicle needs
to authenticate and resolution information needs to be cre-
ated. Pseudonym usage is a vehicle’s use of pseudonyms to
authenticate messages in communication with other vehicles
and infrastructure nodes. If required, some authorities may
perform identity resolution to trace a pseudonym back to an
identity by using information retained in the first step. Revo-
cation is an optional step, in which a vehicle’s identity and
pseudonyms can be revoked to exclude it from participating
in the network. To mitigate scalability issues, a vehicle can
be revoked passively, i.e., only its identity is revoked while
the vehicle can still participate in the network until its current
pseudonyms expire, but it cannot acquire new pseudonyms.
Conditional pseudonymity provides privacy for vehicles and
also accountability. However, vehicles have to trust pseudonym
issuing authorities to store and manage resolution information
securely and responsibly. If resolution information leaks or
becomes openly available, the privacy protection provided by
pseudonyms is undermined. We propose to reconsider the
common assumption that authorities can be fully trusted with
managing information that could render privacy mechanisms
ineffective. Instead, authorities should follow the principles of
minimum disclosure and separation of concerns. Only entities
responsible for identity resolution should be able to access
resolution information while other entities, like pseudonym
issuance authorities, should neither store nor have access to
it. This raises several questions in the VANET context: How
can accountability be achieved without entrusting pseudonym
issuing authorities with resolution information? How can it
be ensured that resolution information can only be used in
legitimate situations by a specific authorities? And to what
extend should linking information be released then?
In this work, we propose a new approach for conditional
pseudonymity in VANETs that addresses these questions. Our
approach achieves accountability without requiring authori-
ties to store resolution information and prevents them from
keeping it. As a result, drivers have to place less trust in
authorities. The scheme also benefits authorities by helping
them comply with privacy regulations and reducing the amount
of sensitive information to be managed. Further, we enforce
the cooperation of several authorities for pseudonym-identity
resolution to ensure multiple parties agreeing on necessity
for resolution. The resolution protocol also provides perfect
forward privacy [3], i.e., only linking information for the
current pseudonym is made available while other pseudonyms
and messages of that user remain unlinkable. Next, we discuss
related work (Sec. II) and the system model (Sec. III), before
presenting and analyzing our approach (Sec. IV, V).
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy and pseudonymity have been discussed in many
research projects like PRIME and there are resulting frame-
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works like Idemix1. However, they are focusing mainly on
Internet-like scenarios that are very different from the VANET
scenarios we are considering herein. Privacy protection is
generally considered mandatory for successful VANET de-
ployment. Most approaches are based on pseudonyms with
identity resolution as proposed by major research projects like
SeVeCom2 or PREDRIVE-C2X3 and standardization efforts,
e.g., carried out by ETSI TC ITS WG5. We conclude that
pseudonym-based solutions are considered the most practical
and promising privacy protection mechanisms in VANETs and
focus on them in our work.
In [3], we analyze the specifics of VANETs and what
requirements this creates for privacy solutions. We also carry
out a broad review of current proposals in the light of those
requirements. While basic schemes work as described in the
introduction, more advanced schemes try to reduce the created
overhead, e.g., with self-signed certificates [4]. Self-signed cer-
tificates create a Sybil attack problem as one cannot limit the
amount of pseudonyms a vehicle controls. A recent approach
tries to contain this problem [5]. [6] proposes a scheme that
enforces collaborative identity resolution. However, resolution
authorities need to participate in pseudonym issuance which
is not desirable. Ideally, we would prefer a strict separation
of concerns so that each entity in our system model has a
clear task and can be implemented independently of other
functionality.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Our system model is based on the SeVeCom system
model [1]. A vehicle V is identifiable by a unique long-term
identifier idV , e.g., an identity certificate and the correspond-
ing key pair. V is registered with an authority CAh, its home
CA identified by idCAh . CAh manages V ’s virtual identity
and issued idV . In practice, a regional vehicle registration
authority could take on this role, thus consolidating authority
over V ’s virtual identity and physical license plates.
V can obtain pseudonyms Pi from pseudonym providers
PPk. Pseudonym providers are independent from CAh so that
V can engage with arbitrary PPk. Before new Pi are issued, V
is authenticated and it is verified that V has not been revoked.
A pseudonym Pi is a public key certificate for a key pair
(PKPi ,SKPi), containing no information linking Pi to V or
any Pj (j = i). When communicating, V signs messages with
secret key SKPi of the current pseudonym Pi. The signature
and Pi are attached to the message for verification by receivers.
The resolution authorities RAl take part in pseudonym-
identity resolution. A subset of them has to cooperate in the
process. RAl should be independent from authorities involved
in the issuance of a pseudonym.
IV. EMBEDDING IDENTITIES IN PSEUDONYMS
Our approach is based on the idea of embedding resolution
information directly in pseudonym certificates rather than
1PRIME website: http://www.prime-project.eu/
2SeVeCom website: http://www.sevecom.org/
3PREDRIVE-C2X website: http://www.pre-drive-c2x.eu/
Authentication phase:
V −→ CAh : (idV , req, σV (req)) (1)
V ←− CAh : (id, PKRA, idCAh , exp, n) (2)
V : Vi = EPKRA (id ‖ ri) (3)
V : Ci = (mi)bi = (Vi ‖ exp ‖ idCAh)bi (4)
V −→ CAh : (C1, . . . , Cn) (5)
V ←− CAh : I (6)
V −→ CAh :
{(
b−1i , ri
) | i ∈ I} (7)
CAh : (Ci)b
−1
i = (mi)bib
−1
i = mi (8)
CAh : mi
?= (EPKRA (id ‖ ri) ‖ exp ‖ idCA)(9)
V ←− CAh : {σCAh(Cj) | j /∈ I} (10)
V : (σCAh(Cj))
b−1j = σCAh(mj) (11)
= σCAh(Vj ‖ exp ‖ idCAh)
Acquisition phase:
V
∗−→ PP : EPKPP (Vi, exp, idCAh , (12)
σCAh(Vi ‖ exp ‖ idCAh), PKPi , σPi(◦))
PP : Pi = (PKPi ,Vi, expPi , idPP ;σPP (◦))(13)
V
∗←− PP : Pi (14)
Fig. 1. Pseudonym issuance protocol.
having authorities store them. idV , idCAh , and a unique ran-
domization factor r are encrypted with PKRA, the commonly
known public key of the resolution authorities. Resulting
ciphertexts, we call them V-tokens, are unlinkable. For ran-
domized encryption schemes, like ElGamal, r is implicitly part
of the encryption scheme, while r must be explicitly included
for deterministic encryption schemes, like RSA.
Pseudonyms with embedded V-tokens are issued in a two
phase protocol, which ensures that V-token content is valid
but prevents issuing authorities from linking pseudonyms to
vehicles (see Sec. IV-A). V uses the resulting pseudonym Pi
for normal message authentication by signing messages with
SKPi and attaching Pi to the message. Receivers verify Pi
and the signature. Thus, embedding the V-token in Pi does
not affect how Pi is used in communications.
If required, pseudonym-identity resolution is performed col-
laboratively by a minimum number of authorities. They need
to jointly decrypt the V-token embedded in a Pi to retrieve the
linking information. Sec. IV-B details the resolution protocol.
A. Privacy-preserving Pseudonym Issuance
The privacy-preserving issuance protocol employs a blind
signature scheme to prevent issuing authorities from learn-
ing linking information. In the authentication phase, V first
obtains blindly signed V-tokens from CAh. Subsequently, V-
tokens are used in the acquisition phase to obtain pseudonyms
from a pseudonym provider PP . The full protocol is given in
Fig. 1 and is detailed in the following.
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1) Authentication phase: The authentication phase between
V and CAh results in one or more V-tokens blindly signed
by CAh. The protocol description has been generalized to
remain independent from a specific signature scheme. We only
assume that a blind signature extension exists for the signing
algorithm, as is the case for RSA [7] or EC-ElGamal [8].
An abstract notation is used for blinding operations. (m)b
indicates a message m blinded with blinding factor b, and
unblinding is represented by ((m)b)b−1 = m with b−1 being
the corresponding unblinding factor. Actual blinding and un-
blinding operations depend on the employed blind signature
scheme and may consist of multiple steps.
We step through the protocol in the following. In (1) V
sends a V-token request req to CAh signed with SKV to
prove identity idV . The structure of req depends on the
chosen authentication scheme and may entail further message
exchange. (2) CAh verifies the signature σV (req) with V ’s
public key PKV and checks internally that V has not been
revoked. CAh then returns to V the composed identifier
id = idCAh ‖ idV to be included in the V-token, the public
key of the resolution authorities PKRA, idCAh , expiration
date exp, and requests n commitments. The expiration date
exp is set to a discrete value, e.g., midnight or last day of the
week, to prevent linking based on individualized exp.
V verifies that id is correct. Then, (3) V creates n V-
tokens Vi by choosing a unique random ri that is appended
to id, before encrypting it with PKRA. exp and idCAh are
appended to each Vi. The expiration date limits the lifetime
of a V-token. idCAh is required for verification purposes
later in the acquisition phase. (4) V then chooses n random
distinct blinding factors bi, with inverse b−1i . Each mi is
blinded, resulting in commitments Ci = (Vi)bi . (5) V sends
C1, . . . , Cn to CAh, and stores the corresponding b−1i and ri.
Now, V is committed to the content encoded in all Ci in the
sense that it cannot manipulate or change the content anymore.
V has to prove probabilistically to CAh that the encoded
content contains id as provided by CAh in (2). As part of
the commitment scheme, CAh asks V to reveal the content of
some random Ci. For this purpose, (6) CAh randomly chooses
h ≥ n/2 commitments Ci and requests the corresponding b−1i
and ri. The selected indices i are organized in the indices
set I which is sent to V . (7) V sends b−1i and ri, i ∈ I,
to CAh. Now, CAh can verify the content of Vi by first (8)
unblinding the commitments Ci with b−1i to obtain mi (i ∈ I).
Then, (9) CAh computes the corresponding V-token with ri.
The result has to be compared to mi. If all unblinded mi are
correct, the remaining n−h commitments Cj (j /∈ I) are also
correct except for an exponentially small probability, i.e., the
probability that V managed to cheat is negligible. This is due
to V not knowing which Ci will be unblinded later when it
creates the commitments, and not being able to change them
when CAh selects the commitments to be opened. See [9] for
a formal analysis of the security of commitment schemes. By
adjusting the ratio of h : n, CAh can control the cheating
probability in trade-off with required overhead.
(10) CAh signs the remaining commitments Cj with its
secret key SKCAh , yielding n−h blind signatures σCAh(Cj)
which are sent to V . In the last step, (11) V unblinds each
σCAh(Cj) by applying the corresponding b−1j (j /∈ I). This
way, V obtains n−h V-tokens Vj , each encrypted with PKRA
and signed by CAh.
2) Acquisition phase: Once in possession of signed V-
tokens, V interacts with a pseudonym providers PPk to obtain
a pseudonym Pi for each signed V-token Vi. The signed
V-token is used as an anonymous authentication credential.
It implicitly certifies that its owner has been authenticated
successfully by CAh, identified by idCAh . To ensure the
anonymity of V when interacting with PP and to ensure
unlinkability between resulting pseudonyms and V , an anony-
mous communication channel is required between the two
parties (denoted by ∗→). Either V uses a previously issued
pseudonym to communicate anonymously or an anonymiza-
tion mechanism like onion routing [10] can be used.
The acquisition phase starts with (12) V generating a new
key pair (PKPi , SKPi) as a pseudonym key pair. Here, the
key generator function of the signature scheme for VANET
authentication is used. V stores SKPi securely. V sends a
pseudonym certification request to PP containing PKPi and
a signed V-token Vi (including exp and idCAh ). V signs the
request with SKPi to prove its ownership. Hereby, σPi(◦)
indicates a signature over a whole message. The request is
further encrypted with PKPP .
PP decrypts the request and verifies σPi(◦). PP checks
the validity of the presented V-token by verifying signature
σCAh(. . . ) with CAh’s well-known public key PKCAh , iden-
tified by idCAh . If valid, PP proceeds by checking that Vi has
not expired and has not been used before (see Sec. IV-A3).
If all checks succeed, (13) PP includes the plain V-token Vi
(without σCAh , exp, and idCAh ) in a pseudonym certificate
Pi for PKPi . Pi also contains an expiration date expPi and
idPP . (14) PP sends Pi to V . V can now use Pi for message
authentication.
We only showed the acquisition of one pseudonym. V can
repeat the acquisition phase for each V-token Vi previously
obtained. V can also acquire pseudonyms from different
pseudonym providers PP by engaging with multiple PPs in
the acquisition phase. This can be advantageous in a region
where a specific pseudonym provider is dominant, i.e., it
issued the majority of pseudonyms used in that region. While
V may usually use pseudonyms of its preferred provider PPa
it can obtain pseudonyms from PPb to prevent sticking out
when travelling through a region dominated by PPb. In theory,
this issue could be avoided by only allowing one pseudonym
provider in the system. However, in practical systems it can
be expected that several pseudonym providers will exist, e.g.,
in different countries.
3) Double spending prevention: The issuance protocol en-
ables V to obtain pseudonyms anonymously from different
pseudonym providers, but V could present one signed V-
token Vi to multiple PPk to obtain more pseudonyms than
it has signed V-tokens. Pseudonyms containing the same Vi
would be trivially linkable, but by using them at different
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spatiotemporal positions linking could be rendered unlikely.
Double spending, i.e., multiple use of tokens, is a well-known
problem of electronic cash and credential systems [11].
Double spending of V-tokens can be prevented by extending
pseudonym provider functionality. Pseudonym providers can
operate a distributed V-token clearing house CH in which
hash values of used V-tokens are stored. In step (13), PP
additionally computes H(Vi) and queries CH for it. H(Vi) is
rejected if it is already in CH and added to it otherwise. Op-
tionally, exp could be stored with H(Vi) to enable automated
deletion of expired entries. Storing only hash values in CH
instead of actual V-tokens reduces storage size and ensures that
CH does not contain any (encrypted) linking information. CH
could be realized as a distributed hash table (DHT) to provide
scalable lookups.
B. Collaborative Identity Resolution
While identity resolution is part of conditional pseudonym-
ity to prevent misuse and abuse of a system, it also exposes
users to potential privacy infringement. Therefore, the infor-
mation required for identity resolution needs to be protected
properly, so that it is only available to some authorities in very
specific situations. Separation of duties is a common principle
to prevent intentional or unintentional misuse of information
or processes. We apply separation of duties to the protection of
identity resolution information. For this purpose, we distribute
the ability to perform identity resolution between a number of
authorities and enforce their collaboration to perform identity
resolution with a threshold encryption scheme.
In our system, identity resolution corresponds to the decryp-
tion of a V-token Vi embedded in a pseudonym Pi to obtain
idV that links Pi to vehicle V . The secret key of the resolution
authorities SKRA is split among n resolution authorities, so
that each holds only a share of SKRA. Cooperation of a subset
of k of n RAs is required to decrypt a V-token, which has
been encrypted with PKRA.
For protocol description, we assume three resolution au-
thorities: a law enforcement agency L, a judge or juridical
institution J , and a data protection agency DP . L wants to
identify the sender of a message with pseudonym Pi, J decides
if evidence provided by L is sufficient to justify identity
resolution, and DP surveys privacy breaches. We will discuss
later how the protocol can be extended for more complex
scenarios. It is assumed that a common public key PKRA
has been published and that the secret key SKRA has been
divided into three shares SKLRA, SKJRA, and SKDPRA . We use a
(3, 3)-threshold scheme, i.e., all three shares need to be applied
to successfully decrypt a V-token Vi = EPKRA (id ‖ ri). The
use of secret sharing homomorphisms [12] and a homomorphic
encryption scheme, e.g., ElGamal [13], enable homomorphic
threshold decryption that prevents SKRA or its shares from
being disclosed in the decryption process. Each party applies
its secret share to Vi, and only when the k-th entity applies
its secret share, EPK(m) is decrypted.
The input for identity resolution is a pseudonym certificate
Pi containing a V-token Vi, for which L is convinced that
L −→ J : (Vi,Ei) (1)
J : VJi = DSKJRA(Vi) (2)
L ←− J : (VJi , σJ(Ei)
) (3)
L −→ DP : (VJi ,Ei, σJ (Ei)
) (4)
DP : VJ,DPi = DSKDPRA
(VJi
) (5)
L ←− DP :
(
VJ,DPi
)
(6)
L : VJ,DP,Li = DSKLRA
(
VJ,DPi
)
(7)
= DSKLRA
(
DSKDPRA
(
DSKJRA (Vi)
))
= DSKRA (EPKRA(id))
= id = idCAh ‖ idV
L −→ CAh : (id) (8)
L ←− CAh : infoV (9)
Fig. 2. Collaborative identity resolution protocol with 3 authorities.
resolution is justified. L collects supporting evidence in the
evidence set Ei. Fig. 2 gives all steps of the protocol which
are now discussed in detail.
First, (1) L extracts Vi from Pi and gathers evidence Ei. L
forwards Vi and Ei to J with a request for identity resolution.
(2) J assesses Ei and either supports or declines identity
resolution on basis of the provided evidence. If J supports
resolution, it decrypts Vi with partial secret SKJRA. J also
signs Ei to certify its approval for identity resolution. This is
optional but can serve for audit purposes. (3) VJi and σJ(Ei)
are returned to L. Note that as long as Vi has been decrypted
by less than k− 1 RAs, no information about the plaintext is
revealed.
Next, (4) L forwards VJi and the evidence signed by J
to DP . DP verifies σJ(Ei) with J’s well-known public
key PKJ . If the signature is valid, DP can either trust
J’s assessment of Ei or perform its own assessment of the
evidence. (5) If DP decides to support identity resolution, it
decrypts VJi with its partial secret SKDPRA . (6) DP returns
VJ,DPi to L.
Now, (7) L can apply its own secret share SKLRA to VJ,DPi
yielding VJ,DP,Li . The threshold k = 3 is reached, thus,
VJ,DP,Li equals the decrypted plaintext identifier id. Note, that
only L learns the linking information id because it applies its
secret share last.
(8) Based on id, L can contact the regional CA (CAh)
responsible for the long-term identity idV to request further
information about vehicle V . CAh looks up idV in its database
and returns information about V to L. If required, CAh can
revoke V ’s long-term identity to prevent V from obtaining
new V-tokens in an additional step.
L has successfully linked pseudonym Pi to vehicle V and
has sufficient information to hold V accountable. The protocol
provides a straightforward approach for identity resolution
with enforced distribution of resolution authority. It is also
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extensible and flexible. For example, the order in which
entities apply their secret share is irrelevant as long as the
k-th entity is the one that should learn the plaintext. We
used a simplified scenario with only three RAs to outline the
protocol, but hierarchical secret sharing schemes exist [14]
that can model multilevel hierarchies with different threshold
values for different subtrees. Such a scheme can be instantiated
to reflect the external and internal organizational structure of
RAs and how secret shares are distributed and divided further.
Another aspect to consider is the initial computation of
the key pair (PKRA, SKRA) and splitting of SKRA, which
should not rely on a trusted party. Instead, a secure multi-
party computation (MPC) protocol, such as in [15], should
be used that allows participating RAs to jointly compute
(PKRA, SKRA) and individual secret shares, without reveal-
ing SKRA in the process. The setup of an MPC scheme for
key initialization is out of scope of this work.
V. ANALYSIS
Our analysis focuses on the protocols’ ability to resist
security and privacy attacks. We have identified two general
categories of potential attacks. In a repudiation attack, V tries
to cheat the issuance protocol in order to evade accountability.
In a linking attack, other entities aim to link pseudonyms
or V-tokens to V or each other. We assume that adversaries
participating in the issuance or resolution protocol behaves
semi-honest, i.e., adhere to defined protocol steps. Thus, denial
of service attacks are excluded in the following. For linking
attacks, we additionally assume that the adversary does not
have access to V ’s sensitive key material. This also includes
V-tokens signed by CAh. This assumption can be realized in
practical systems by storing such data in a tamper-resistant
hardware security module in the vehicle [1].
A. Repudiation Attacks
Vehicle V could try to mount a repudiation attack with
the aim of evading non-repudiation. Thus, the attack goal is
to prevent that correct identity information is embedded in
pseudonyms in the issuance protocol (see Fig. 1).
In the authentication phase, V could try to include a
wrong identifier in Vi in step (3). This is prevented by the
commitment scheme [9], which ensures that CAh would detect
a wrong identifier with exponentially large probability in step
(9). At the same time, it is not possible for CAh to include a
wrong identifier because V generates the V-token itself.
In the acquisition phase, V could try to submit an arbitrary
bitstring instead of a V-token to PP , or a real V-token
extracted from a pseudonym of another vehicle. Both attacks
would not be successful, because PP requires a valid signature
by a CA, i.e., CAh, on a V-token to accept it. V-tokens that
have already been embedded in a pseudonym do not carry
a CA signature any more and would also be detected by
querying the distributed clearinghouse in (13) (see Fig. 1).
B. Linking Attacks
In a linking attack, an adversary tries to link pseudonyms or
V-tokens to their respective holder, i.e., vehicle V . Adversaries
in a linking attack can either be entities actively participating
in the issuance or resolution protocols or external entities not
involved in the protocols. Note, that linking attacks based on
vehicle tracking are out of scope of this work.
An external adversary may perform a linking attack in order
to infer vehicle movement patterns, which afterwards could
be combined with further external information that enables
inference of the vehicle identity. By definition, pseudonym
certificates contain no linkable information. Encoded public
keys and certificate identifiers are generated randomly. Pseu-
donyms can also not be linked based on V-tokens embedded
in them, due to the randomization factor r, which ensures that
V-token ciphertexts are randomized and unlinkable. However,
idPP could facilitate linking of pseudonyms if V successively
uses pseudonyms issued by one PP , in a region where most
vehicles use pseudonyms issued by another PP . As discussed
before, this can be thwarted by obtaining pseudonyms from
multiple providers or from the PP most dominant in a specific
region. Thus, vehicle V can control the success likelihood of
such a linking attack by its choice of PP for a given context.
Potential linking attacks that involve protocol participants
are discussed separately per protocol.
1) During pseudonym issuance: In the pseudonym issuance
protocol, CAh, PP , or both could act as adversaries. We
can analyze what information each party learns during pro-
tocol execution by defining their respective knowledge sets
K(CAh) and K(PP ). CAh knows idV because it maintains
V ’s information. It learns the opened commitments, which
however do not contain new information. The blind signature
scheme in steps (4)-(11) prevents CAh from learning which
V-tokens it signed. So at the end of the acquisition phase the
knowledge set of CAh, with i ∈ I, is
K(CAh) = {idCAh , idV , req, id, exp, C1, . . . , Cn,mi} .
PP learns the presented V-token Vi and the pseudonym Pi it
issues, but not idV :
K(PP ) = {idPP ,Vi, exp, idCAh , expPi , Pi} .
Further, we define the identity set I(V ) = {idV } and the
anonymity set A(V ) = {Vi, Pi} for vehicle V . An adversary
can only link a pseudonym to V if it knows at least one item
from I(V ) and one from A(V ) after protocol execution. Thus,
to prevent linking the following condition must be fulfilled:
K(X) ∩ I(V ) = ∅ ∨K(X) ∩A(V ) = ∅.
This holds true for CAh and also for PP :
K(CAh) ∩ I(V ) = I(V ), K(CAh) ∩A(V ) = ∅
K(PP ) ∩ I(V ) = ∅, K(PP ) ∩A(V ) = A(V ).
Therefore, neither CAh nor PP can link Pi and idV on their
own. We can further show that linking is not possible even if
CAh and PP collude. Because authentication and acquisition
phase are decoupled, a shared information set between CAh
and PP would be required for linking:
K(CAh) ∩K(PP ) = {idCAh , exp} .
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Thus, CAh and PP could only encode linking information
in idCAh and exp. Although CAh originally specifies idCAh
and exp in the authentication phase, V can ultimately verify
them in step (4). V can prevent CAh from issuing traceable
V-tokens by requiring a fixed identifier idCAh and that exp
adheres to a fixed expiration scheme, e.g., noon, midnight, or
end of the week. Therefore, the pseudonym issuance protocol
is robust against linking attacks by any of the involved parties.
2) During identity resolution: The identity resolution pro-
tocol is flexible in terms of definition and structure of secret
sharing schemes and thresholds in order to be adjusted to
organizational requirements. Participants of the secret sharing
scheme should be selected in a way that reduces incentives
for collusion, e.g., because of inherently divergent interests.
We assume that participants have been chosen in a way that
results in a negligible probability of a collusion of ≥ k parties,
for decryption threshold k.
Returning to our example from Sec. IV-B with authorities
L, J , and DP and k = 3, it is apparent that no information
about the content of V-token Vi is revealed until all parties
applied their secret shares and the threshold is reached. By
analyzing the knowledge sets after protocol execution of each
party, we see that J and DP do not gain information about
V through execution of the protocol:
K(L) = {Pi,Vi,Ei, idV , infoV } ,K(J) = K(DP) = {Vi,Ei}
Thus, J and DP can participate in the protocol without
learning id. Only L learns the content of Vi, but this is the aim
of the protocol. The protocol cannot prevent L from sharing
id with other parties after resolution. But this is an inherent
problem of any protocol in which sensitive information needs
to be revealed, e.g., credit card transactions.
When L and CAh exchange information in steps (8) and
(9) (see Fig. 2), Pi and Vi have already been linked to V , as
is the purpose of the protocol. However, neither L nor CAh
gain direct information about any other Pj or Vk (j, k = i)
belonging to V . Therefore, perfect forward privacy [3] is
achieved, i.e., the resolution of one pseudonym to an identity
does not facilitate linking of other pseudonyms of that user.
What is left to analyze is if it is feasible for an entity
that knows idV and PKRA, e.g., L or CAh, to compute all
possible V-tokens for vehicle V with an exhaustive search
over r. The purpose would be tracking of a single vehicle V by
linking the Pi and Vi to V . In the case that idV and PKRA are
known to the adversary, the security of the V-token depends
on the bitsize of the randomization factor r. By choosing r
sufficiently large, such an attack is rendered infeasible. But
larger r entail larger V-tokens and pseudonyms and, thus, a
tradeoff between security and communication costs is required.
Due to space limitations, we will provide an analysis of this
attack and tradeoff in future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
The outlined approach for conditional pseudonymity in
vehicular networks does not require pseudonym-identity map-
pings to achieve accountability. Instead, resolution information
is embedded as encrypted unlinkable V-tokens in pseudonym
certificates. As a result, the privacy of vehicles is enhanced in
multiple ways. No authorities need to be trusted to protect
privacy sensitive resolution information, identity resolution
requires the cooperation of several authorities in order to
be successful, and perfect forward privacy is provided. At
the same time, authorities can still determine the identity of
a pseudonym holder when necessary, but without the need
to manage large amounts of critical information requiring
secure storage and protection. With our V-token approach,
each vehicle carries its own resolution information, thus, also
providing a scalability advantage.
We have also shown that the issuance and resolution proto-
cols are resistant against repudiation and linking attacks. The
security of V-tokens can be controlled but entails a tradeoff
with communication costs. In future work, we will provide
an extended analysis of this tradeoff. We are also currently
evaluating with simulations how the additional overhead of
embedded V-tokens in pseudonyms affects inter-vehicular
communications in scenarios with varying traffic density.
As a future extension, we also plan to include pseudonym
revocation in our scheme.
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